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Article 5

Dagon as Queer Assemblage:
Effeminacy and Terror in Samson
Agonistes
DREW DANIEL

Introduction: The Foul Yoke of Effeminacy

T

hough it is now many years since the original controversy erupted with
John Carey’s assertion in a review of Stanley Fish’s How Milton Works that
“September 11 has changed Samson Agonistes,” the repercussions of this
fractious public debate continue to inflect how the work is read at the present
time.1 In the wake of this polarizing conflict, interpretation of the poem as a
complex whole has been upstaged by an urgent pressure to critically avow or
disavow Samson’s final action as either divinely inspired or pathological, with the
tantalizingly over- determined massacre of the assembled Philistines in the temple
of Dagon functioning for both sides as evidence for – or against – an authorial
endorsement of the spectre of “terrorism” allegedly mobilized within Milton’s
closet drama. What are we to make of the “rousing motions” that lie at the core
of this poem’s central moment of decision? How might the possibilities of a
“queer Milton” or, for that matter, a “queer Samson,” reorient this seemingly
intractable crux? It is my gambit that a consideration of the constitutive links
between effeminacy and terror – links I shall trace both across the Miltonic corpus
and within its titular character – might allow us to rethink recent critical traffic
between Samson Agonistes and the security state by exposing a queer logic of nearresemblance through which Milton’s text both solicits and frustrates typological
expectation.
Samson Agonistes (1671) establishes a rhythmic emotional pattern in which
hopeful visitors try to draw Samson out of his thing-like withdrawal, and are
rewarded with either brutally reflexive rejection or violent threats. To (briefly)
rehearse the dramatic sequence of events: His father Manoa proposes that a
ransom be paid in order to liberate Samson from enslavement, tempting him with
the possibility of a return home. His estranged wife Dalila seeks reconciliation, and
tries to tempt him with the promise of “conjugal affection.” The brute Harapha
tries to tempt Samson into single combat to determine the relative supremacy of
the god of Israel against a pagan challenger. Finally, his captors try to tempt
Samson to display his strength and submission for the Philistine elite. This dialogic
sequence of temptations refused cumulatively builds an affective tension between
violence and compliance that leads to the work’s notorious catastrophe. After a

Early Modern Culture 10 (2014): 62-87
Republished 2018
©Clemson University Press

Queer Milton

mysterious transformation in which “I begin to feel / Some rousing motions in
me which dispose / To something extraordinary my thoughts,” Samson permits
himself to attend the enemy’s “holy day” (1381-83).2 His ironic performance of
pseudo- submission culminates in an offstage act of horrific violence: Samson
pulls down the pillars that support the theater-like structure in which the Philistine
nobility are celebrating their triumph, in the process destroying the feast of Dagon
and himself.
If these potentially compromising temptations loosely parallel the series
of temptations rejected by Christ in the poetic drama’s textual partner, Paradise
Regained, the intended consequence of that typological pressure remains subject to
a curiously restricted pair of options: typology or anti-typology, a binary that drives
even Julia Lupton’s show-stopping critical formulation that “Milton’s Samson is
finally not typological (a figure of Christ), or even typological in a terminally
suspended way (“exil’d from light”), but anti-typological, arresting the recuperative
moment of typology in the sheer violence of his act.”3 Faced with a choice between
a Samson that resembles Christ and a Samson that deliberately fails to sustain such
a resemblance, I want to risk a question that is deliberately impertinent to the
prevailing debate: how might the queer textual experience of Samson’s effeminacy
complicate the problem of typological resemblance itself? Going further, how
might the pursuit of this question open out both the conjunctive disjunction of
Milton studies with queer studies, and the sticky relevance of Samson Agonistes to
the security state it supposedly prefigures?
Samson’s stony, stoic refusals, and the upsurge of superhuman athleticism
that overwhelms them, have together consolidated his identity as the definitive
avatar of masculine fortitude, the idée reçu of the strong, silent type. Milton has
other ideas. Far from impregnable and self-evident, in Samson Agonistes Samson’s
manhood is marked first and foremost by a persistent anxiety about its capacity to
betray itself and transform into a disastrously compromising effeminacy. Tracking
this as a historical structure with critical effects upon the present, in this essay as
a whole I shall move between “manhood” and “masculinity” as the gendered term
against which Samson’s “effeminacy” shows up as its threatening structural
inversion. For my purposes, “manhood” should be understood not only in relation
to boundaries of gender but also to boundaries of ethos, polis and species; in early
modernity, the opposite of manhood is not (only) “womanhood” or “femininity”
but also in-civility, brutality, animality, in- humanity.4 The conceptual space of the
“un-manly” thus constitutes a negative reserve in which class, ethnicity, species,
and gender differences mutually figure each other, and reservoirs of meaning from
any of these separate registers can flow into the space opened up within manhood
by effeminacy.
Anxiety about the inward contamination of male gender by effeminate
possibility constitutes a thread of queer fear that runs throughout Milton’s poetry
and his prose, taking different local forms each time, but sharing a family
resemblance with its locus classicus, the angelic reproach in Paradise Lost directed
at “Man’s effeminate slackness” (11.632). Samson’s self-hatred focuses its energy
through an insistent proclamation of the “effeminacy” he supposedly
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demonstrated in succumbing to Dalila's demands that he reveal the secret of his
strength:
At times when men seek most repose and rest,
I yielded, and unlocked her all my heart,
Who with a grain of manhood well resolved
Might easily have shook off all her snares:
But foul effeminacy held me yoked
Her bond-slave. O indignity, O blot
To honor and religion! Servile mind
Rewarded well with servile punishment! (406-413)
Samson’s scenario of “yielding” and “unlocking” in the night summons up the
remorseful laments of despoiled maidens bewailing the loss of their virginity – but
ironically what has been lost here (momentarily displaced? forever dissolved?) is
not maidenhood, but “manhood.” The reference to other men as a class marks
Samson as somehow cut off from homosocial solidarity, defenseless against his
own servile gullibility. “Holding” him against his will, effeminacy is made here into
an agent whose foul embrace cannot be withstood.5
Here we must attend to a discrepancy in the signification of “effeminacy”
itself within the period. The term could designate a male with “womanly”
characteristics, its first meaning, but it could also signify a male with an inordinate
weakness for women; as the OED notes in reference to usage in Caxton (1460)
and Puttenham (1589), “the notion ‘self-indulgent, voluptuous’ seems sometimes
to have received a special colouring from a pseudo-etymological rendering of the
word as ‘devoted to women’. Unequivocal instances are rare.”6 If we keep this second
definition in mind, then Samson’s self-accusation may simply be directed at his
gullibility, and his indulgence of his wife. Certainly the Biblical source in the book
of Judges sounds this note, with its joke-like repetition of Dalila’s demand for
Samson’s secret eventually producing the desired revelation in a disastrous display
of credulity. Secondarily speaking, “effeminate” could simply be a synonym for
“uxorious.”
Yet the capacity of the meaning of effeminacy in the period to slide
between its two distinct definitions also usefully marks an ambient difference
between early modern understandings of gender and normative (if equally
debatable) “modern” schemas of sexual orientation. In our own cultural moment,
in which we are subject to the reified sexological categories of heterosexuality and
homosexuality and are schooled by popular psychology to probe for the occulted
undersides of how those locations manifest themselves in everyday life, an
“effeminate” male potentially falls under suspicion of so-called “latent” or
unacknowledged homosexuality in a manner compatible with the first meaning
but necessarily incongruous with the second. By contrast, for early modern
subjects the polarities of “masculine” and “feminine” stand in a more volatile
relationship as, on the one hand, social positions structured by rigid and divinely
ordered prescriptions about rule and obedience, and, on the other, developmental
outcomes placed by classical physiology into an entangling proximity.
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Effeminacy’s second definition within early modernity draws its strength
from a historically distinct morphological imaginary sourced, ultimately, in a
classical inheritance. Samson’s sense of effeminacy as an invasion from within
recalls John J. Winkler’s formulation of sex and gender in classical Mediterranean
culture as one in which “‘woman is not only the opposite of man; she is also a
potentially threatening ‘internal émigré’ of masculine identity.”7 Such a possibility
might be said to constitute the bad dream of the so-called “One Sex model” so
widespread within New Historicist readings of Galenic physiology in the wake of
Thomas Laqueur’s seminal Making Sex. If women are only born women because
of their stalled developmental progress within the womb en route to becoming
men, might it not also be possible that “from within” a man might somehow lapse
and slide backwards towards another gendered location? This is the inverse
scenario to the hermaphroditic possibility that animates that touchstone of New
Historicist thought on the swerves and curves of gender normativity, Steven
Greenblatt’s “Fiction and Friction” in Shakespearean Negotiations, in which sufficient
heat permits the extroversion of “Marie” le Marcis’s female genitals into their final,
normative male form as the male genitals of Marin le Marcis.8 If the pseudo-revolt
of transvestite theater described therein through Greenblatt’s reading of Viola
occurred under the protective shade of a normative masculine superiority, then,
framed against this New Historicist critical rubric, the effeminate male is the early
modern gender system’s worst possible outcome. This is so not because he is a
figure neither successfully masculine nor authentically feminine (granting that such
secondary authenticity is in a peculiar sense impossible given the inherent
insufficiency of the feminine position), but because, as a backslider, he is the only
agent capable of betraying the forward course of masculine supremacy itself.
Loitering with intent in a contaminating interstitial space between genders, the
early modern effeminate man is a gender recusant.
Acutely afraid of his own effeminacy but also eager to self-consciously
punish himself for it, Samson seems at pains to accuse himself of specifically the
second kind of effeminacy – but he risks protesting too much in the process, and
his accounts of that condition slide uncomfortably “forwards” (proleptically,
historically) towards the first definition, with its connotations of a contaminating
inward marker of feminine qualities and, specifically, with a feminine “weakness”
in the face of sexual advances. In Samson’s imagination, this state capaciously
opens itself to suggestions of anal rape and military dramas of subjection, captivity,
and male homoeroticism. The self-accusation of “effeminacy” recurs in Samson’s
thoughts on the uselessness of a merely occasional temperance in a manner which
telegraphs his terror at occupying a permissive, receptive, passive position: “What
boots it at one gate to make defense, / And at another to let in the foe /
Effeminately vanquished?” (560-562). The “other gate” in this image is an
unexpected entryway into one’s self. In this military scenario (the image is one of
attackers penetrating a town’s line of defense) “to be conquered” and “to be
effeminate” somehow lead to and verify each other. Effeminacy makes one a ripe
and justified target for conquest, and having been conquered confirms and ratifies
that effeminacy, securing a lasting shame for the vanquished by retroactively
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projecting a prior condition felt to somehow merit domination as its confirming
response.
What relationships might there be between this foundational terror about
the masculine self’s inbuilt feminine possibility and other forms of terror, in
particular terror at – not to mention acts of terror against – the unseen multitude
of racial, religious, and sexual others which crowd in at an uncertain distance
around the blind Samson? What are the links between the public display of
Samson as the shaved and humiliated prisoner of war and his own anxiety about
the loss of manhood? To what extent does Dagon’s formal hybridity incite or call
forth an act of terror from Samson, and in what way might this response index a
certain constitutive linkage or provoking resemblance between effeminate
manhood and pagan assemblage?
In pursuit of some provisional answers to these questions, I intend to
borrow some critical tools from recent queer studies, not without some anxiety of
my own. I adapt the phrase “queer assemblage” and its partners “terrorist
assemblage” and “terrorist look-alike” from Jasbir Puar’s work on the mutually
reinforcing homophobic and xenophobic logics (or, if you prefer, anxieties) in play
within certain persistent acts of violence taking place under the shadow of the
overarching and, yes, ongoing “war on Terror.”9 In the related figures of the
terrorist look-alike and the suicide bomber Puar identifies two manifestations of a
politically and racially volatile form of queerness, one that alternately embodies
violence and triggers pre-emptive or compensatory acts of violence in response to
the ambient anxieties of the new security state. The exploding bodies of a suicide
bomber-and-their-bystanders constitute a “terrorist assemblage” that violently reorganizes human and machine, flesh and explosive, criminal agent and victim,
body and urban space, leveling and mixing and reforming both individual bodies
and social bodies through radical acts of transformation. In Puar’s analysis,
“Terrorist look-alikes” and “queer assemblages” denote less an identifiable sexual
/ racial / religious / cultural category than a vertiginous failure of social location
and the opening up of a threateningly non-specific possibility that constitutes what
is “queer” now about those bodies that do not allow an implied patriotic “us” to
feel safe.
In the first case, the figure of the “terrorist look alike” (say, a turbaned
man in an airport) induces a panicked proceduralism about the universality of
security screening in response to a de facto profiling which anxiously overlays
virtual terrorism onto racialized bodies and faces. By contrast, “queer assemblage”
is broader in scope and application, but in a particularly forceful reading Puar’s
text considers the joining of bodies and turbans in Sikh masculinity as a
combinatorial assemblage in a Deleuzian sense: the interface fashioned between
fabric and flesh constitutes an essenceless concatenation of materials with
expressive consistency across a range of examples distributed across geographic
space and political history, making the resulting point of contact into a constant
site of becoming and intensification.10 This particular assemblage is queer twice
over, insofar as its presentation troubles gendered norms and in the process snarls
the matrices of gender identity and citizenship/national identity. As conceptual
assemblages themselves, Puar’s terms can seem highly unstable: are they
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descriptions of bodies or descriptions of the ideologically framed ways in which
bodies show up for (paranoid, hostile) spectators? Do they describe a political
situation or a prevalent phobic response to a political situation?
Describing racist attacks on Sikh men in the wake of 9/11, Puar’s analysis
flags the symbolic importance of forcibly removing hair in a manner that
inadvertently recalls the symbolic subjection of the captured, shaved and blinded
Samson:
It is not for nothing that in one hate crime incident after
another, turbans are clawed at viciously, and hair is pulled,
occasionally even cut off. The intimacy of such violence
cannot be overstated. The attack functions as a double
emasculation: the disrobing is an insult to the (usually) male
representative (Sikh or Muslim) of the community, while the
removal of the hair entails submission by and to normative
patriotic masculinities.11
While in this particular context the subject of this violence is the (mis)recognized
Sikh male wrongly accused and attacked for summoning up the anxiety of a
nonspecific but endlessly imminent terrorist threat in their onlookers (finally, a
wished for end to the threat level orange cloud of unknowing implication in which
we live), in her work as a whole the term “queer assemblages” seems to designate
a field of affect magnetized by the tension between two related but opposed
positions and the bodies that occupy them: the “terrorist look-alike” body of the
turbaned Sikh male, and the “terrorist assemblage” of the suicide bomber, a body
that is comprised of organic and inorganic materials, a hybrid creation of
machine/flesh set to violently reconfigure urban space. The difficulty of the term
is that each body in and of itself constitutes a “queer assemblage,” but each
functions through the total field of quasi-legibility which their capacity to stand
for each other generates (the fear generated by the civic circulation of the
supposed “terrorist look-alike” might be the primary site through which the
imagined body of the “suicide bomber” operates more effectively to claim
social/psychic territory than in any particular site of explosion), and so in a sense
this differential field too constitutes a “queer assemblage.” Each term triggers their own
queer effects, and each occupies a contested zone of signification within the
ongoing war on terror – for the queer critic no less than for the subject of
“normative patriotic masculinity.”
As Jasbir Puar extends the term, queerness has more to do with a certain
affective indeterminacy than it does to any available taxonomy of legible sexual
practices. In resonant sympathy with both the work of Lee Edelman, Jack
Halberstam, Madhavi Menon and others, for Puar queerness is not an identity one
comfortably inhabits but a charge set off by what does not scan, what shows up
as somehow other; her work accordingly seeks out queerness in “the unexpected,
the unplanned irruptions, the lines of flight, the denaturalizing of expectation.”12
At this political moment, what could be less reassuring than the “MonsterTerrorist-Fag,” Puar and Amit Rai’s term of art for the absolutely inassimilable
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figure of the “terrorist look-alike” caught in the glance of the security guard, the
potentially queer body of the turbaned Sikh male whose turban (like and unlike a
headscarf) is said to induce a layered pair of interpretive anxieties (potentially
female? potentially terrorist?) for its onlookers. The queer assemblage of the
“monster-terrorist-fag” is felt to anchor by contrast the normative patriotic
masculinity of both straight society and, in a decisive turn for Puar’s analysis, a
privileged (white) body of gay and lesbian “proud Americans” who are by contrast
eager to vouch for their fealty to neoliberal tolerance in opposition to a Muslim
outside now reified as inherently un-and-anti-queer. This implicitly Islamophobic
polarity of affiliation conscripts the “properly queer” liberal and racialized subjects
– piously invoked in every LGBTQ rollcall – into service as supposed victims
under threat from Arab, Sikh, Muslim and South Asian communities, in the
process erasing the existence of queers from those groups and tacitly pinkwashing
Western democracies.13 This framing constitutes a second differential field: the
“queer assemblage” of anxiety and reaction that separates the “homonationalist”
community from its rejected “terrorist look-alikes.”
“Queer assemblages” do not show up in a triumphalist claiming of
individual voices or communities but in moments of rupture in the socially
negotiated; the assemblage is not an assembly, the communal or ghetto-ized safe
space for consumption staked as a freehold within heteronormativity. “Queer
assemblage” designates a corporeal, sexual, technological, cultural and historical
manifold and tries to keep in play the queer body’s provisional status as an
arrangement open to interpretation and subject to change: bodies extended in time
(think of the passages a transgendered body has undergone as an arc of becoming),
bodies marked by violence, bodies marked by choice. It refers to, but does not
capture and contain, an account of the queer body as a hybrid body, a part-object,
something supplemented, perhaps enhanced, modified, or altered, something unnatural, a somatic border area with all gates open.
Accordingly, in invoking “Dagon as queer assemblage,” I am relying upon
this elasticity in order to bring out more fully the somatic queerness of Dagon as
a node in the terrified / fascinated imagination of John Milton, and of Samson
within Milton’s work. That is, Dagon’s mixture into “one” body of elements both
male and female, human and animal, monstrous sovereign deity and humiliated
victim of torture, represents the entirely corporeal and somatic quintessence of
sin-saturated embodiment, but it does so as an assemblage that is “in some sense
machined-together”: this “sea-idol” is both a poetic construction and yet also the
flesh-iest form that flesh can take, occupying the farthest and lowest point from,
say, the angelic trans-sexuality imagined in Paradise Lost.
In relocating Puar’s terms and impressing them into service in a reading
of seventeenth century religious drama, I am producing a necessarily wrenching
and “forced” cutting and re- assemblage of elements from Milton scholarship and
queer studies into an encounter that will no doubt seem rather suspect from
certain locations on both sides of this divide. But I hope to justify such hostagetaking. When read in terms of the overdetermined significations within its
scriptural origin(s), and in the cluster of anxieties about sexuality which show up
within Milton’s creative re-use of this pagan god, Dagon’s bodily form shows up
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as a “queer assemblage” sourced trans-historically from an anachronistic series of
layered meanings, species and genders. But the same can be said for Dagon’s
nemesis. A shaved and humiliated political prisoner put on display by a foreign
power in an attempt to further disenfranchise a subject people, an anxiously hypermasculine hero prone to passionate displays of self-hatred for the taint of
effeminacy, Samson shows up as both a “queer assemblage” to himself and a
“terrorist look-alike” for contemporary criticism, insinuating himself into public
space and then destroying it.14 Alternately absolutely powerless and absolutely
powerful, in its capacious overtaking of boundary conditions Samson’s body
reduplicates the formal hybridity of Dagon: a blind-yet- illuminated mind buried
within a body that acquires and loses traits of both genders, a body that partakes
of creaturely conditions at the border between the animal and the human, a body
frozen in postures of living death and roused by inward motions of divine fury.

Milton Studies vs. Queer Studies: a “Clash of Civilizations”?
Faced with the claim that Milton’s literary representations of Dagon and Samson
“show up as” queer assemblages, one may well be tempted to ask “for whom?”
Though perhaps this special issue will prove the contrary, at this point Milton
studies and queer studies appear to have little to say to each other. That this is so
emerges from a perhaps not accidental historical divide, and is compounded by
the habits and tendencies peculiar to both camps. To state the obvious: the first
waves of “queer theory” were consolidated around the reading of British and
American nineteenth century literature and culture in dialogue with and informed
by, however much they critiqued or expanded, Foucault’s History of Sexuality,
Volume I, and were marked by an oft- simplified and widely disseminated assertion
supposedly found therein concerning the nineteenth century sexological origins of
homosexual identity qua medically legible category of personhood.15 The ensuing
early modern critical responses and correctives, from Bruce R. Smith, Jonathan
Goldberg, Mario DiGangi, Richard Rambuss, Madhavi Menon and others tended
to concentrate upon the drama of Shakespeare and Marlowe, or the lyric poetry
of Barnfield and Spenser, usefully bringing the nineteenth century homosexual
into an uncannily disjunctive historical/critical relationship with the anticipatory
but distinct figure of the early modern sodomite. Yet in all the fertile and ongoing
work to read and theorize about same-sex desire in early modern culture, Milton
seems, all too frequently, conspicuously absent from the discussion. Given the
otherwise voluminous amount of work on sex and gender in Milton’s writing, such
a lacuna still needs explaining.16 I would venture to suggest that this scholarly nogo area has everything to do with the tenor of Milton scholarship, in which a
constitutive anxiety about “ruining the sacred truths” and a vexed awareness of
the watchful paternal gaze of an authorial super-ego seems, still, to inhibit the
scene of critical investigation when the subject is sexuality.
There are exceptions to this rule, notably Gregory Bredbeck’s Sodomy and
Interpretation: From Marlowe to Milton (1991) as well as articles by Jonathan Goldberg,

Early Modern Culture 10

69

Dagon as Queer Assemblage

Bruce Boehrer, Claude Summers, Ross Leasure and Philip Rollinson (to name only
a few). But it seems that each attempt to connect Milton’s literary corpus to the
concerns and methodologies of queer studies ritualistically reasserts its lonely and
embattled status. While describing the suppression of the accusations of buggery
of male servants against Mervin Touchet in the Castlehaven scandal (now widely
regarded as essential to the background of Milton’s “A Masque at Ludlow Castle,
1934” [Comus]), Ross Leasure notes that “such tactics were especially employed
when dealing with Touchet’s homosexual activities, and may coincide with the
general reticence of Miltonists [. . .] to acknowledge anything “queer” in or about
the Miltonian canon.”17 Leasure is not alone in feeling so alone.
The constructive scholarly work that has been done has been dominated
by redemptive patterns of recovery, of the search for encrypted or lost homosexual
meaning in an alternately despairing and affirmative historiographical mode that
Heather Love has memorably identified as “emotional rescue.”18 In Sodomy and
Interpretation Gregory Bredbeck makes the promising claim that Milton’s work
“suggests a space of meaning outside the heterocentrically prescriptive codes of
ideal Renaissance genders,”19 The most compelling example of this outer space
beyond gender normativity occurs in Paradise Lost’s account of angelic sexuality,
whose ambiguous suggestions of “a life of homosexual promiscuity” prompted
dismissive foreclosure of these “filthy” and “foolish” notions from C. S. Lewis in
his Preface to Paradise Lost. Yet, in a chapter forbiddingly titled “The Mistake About
Milton’s Angels,” Lewis evades the specter of male homosexual angels by recourse
to an even queerer formulation of a celestial hermaphroditic free- for-all:
[. . .] there exists among these creatures, according to Milton,
something that might be called trans-sexuality. The impulse
of mutual love is expressed by the total interpenetration of
two aereal bodies; ‘total they mix’ because they are ductile
and homogenous- they mix like wine and water, or like two
wines.20
Bredbeck notes that “while the fallen spirits can range freely throughout the
system of sex and gender, unfallen spirits can range freely outside of it.”21 Yet,
frustratingly, having noted this Bredbeck generally sticks to the script of simply
discovering or uncovering traces of male homosexuality in the Miltonic text. In
response to the willful resistance to homosexual signification prevalent within
Milton criticism, Bredbeck seems more interested in the compensatory
demonstration that homoerotic meaning was available to Milton within the period
courtesy of classical pastoral, and that, in choosing not to assign sodomitical
temptation but rather patriarchal temptation to Belial, Milton demonstrated on at
least one occasion a willingness to refrain from deploying one available
commonplace of anti-sodomy rhetoric. The affirmative cast of such critical quarry
is a first step, but one whose lonesome echo calls for a following response which
reconsiders the volatility of the a-gendered zones that both Milton’s work and
Lewis’ text potentially make available to the queer critic.
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Bredbeck’s recovery of the lost non-heteronormative potential of
Milton’s angels is a tantalizing possibility upstaged by the central importance
within his chapter that he grants to a momentary holiday from homophobic abuse
in Paradise Regained; the real stakes of the project hinge upon the attempt to infer
some kind of provisional glimmer of acceptance, or at least recognition of a
specifically male homosexual possibility as slightly less than the worst thing that
could happen, within the Miltonic corpus. This kind of stance towards the lost or
encrypted homosexuality exemplifies what Foucault termed “the consoling play
of recognitions” at the core of traditional historical practice in his essay
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”22 Bredbeck’s introductory scene of the queer
theorist righting the homophobic wrongs of past scholarship remains mired in a
self-serving rhetoric about gay male visibility that belies the conformist contours
of its own structuring imperative as a scene in which the proliferation of “transsexual” meanings is replaced by the interpretive production of legibly homosexual,
i.e. homo-normative, male subjects.23
I want to suggest that if queer readers are to engage Milton’s writing
otherwise, we should not only hunt for buried, encrypted, or subterranean
representations of homosexuality and homoeroticism that are potentially positive
or affirmative in character, but also attend more closely to the negative affects of
anxiety, shame and hostility generated by moments of queer possibility within
these texts, and try to think about how issues of form, monstrosity, racialization,
and hybridity inflect the operation of textual “queerness.” Instead of hopefully
amplifying one solitary instance in which Milton pulls a punch and demurs from
attacking sodomy with gusto, one might also want to discuss the far more frequent
occasions on which he happily and enthusiastically does exactly that, and to listen
more closely to the grain and character of that hostility. These moments of
antagonism and hatred for sodomy and effeminacy seem intuitively more
consistent with the overall tenor of Milton’s religious commitments and rhetorical
postures as I read and understand them, and owning up to them in the context of
a queer reading might allow us to avoid the “Milton-one-of-us syndrome” that
Marshall Grossman has identified as one of the stumbling blocks to
appropriationist encounters with Milton that seek to reform or refashion Milton
to better resemble contemporary ideals.24 Such a reorientation seems necessary if
we are to provide a productive account of how and where “queerness” surfaces
within the Miltonic corpus.

Blind Sodomites and Hybrid Animals
Comprising curiously macho fifteen-year-old female virgins, curiously weepy
shaven- headed strongmen, coy trans-sexual angels, thyrsus-wielding Virgilian
shepherds, and Puritan propagandists prone to curiously theatrical displays of antitheatrical ranting, Miltonic queerness is an affective/rhetorical manifold that
swings both ways between praise and blame. But it tends towards blame. When it
arises in the prose writing, queer meanings and significations produce a choppy
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linguistic surface of strongly negative repudiation, virulent disgust and comic
scorn. Milton’s willingness to rhetorically tar his enemies with a sodomitical brush
is an old habit born during his first officially sanctioned engagement for the
Council of State as Secretary for Foreign Tongues of the interregnum government,
Eikonoklastes (1649). In the preface to that text, those who praise and dote upon
Charles I’s defects, because they are his, are said to inhabit a state of “strucken
blindness” which borders upon the comparable spiritual blindness of Sodomites:
That they who from the first beginning or but now of late,
by what unhappiness I know not, are so much affatuated
not with his person only but with his palpable faults, and
dote upon his deformities, may have none to blame but their
own folly if they live and die in such a strucken blindness,
as next to that of Sodom hath not happened to any sort of
men more gross or more misleading.25
That sodomites are accused of spiritual blindness is a telling accusation coming
from someone in the midst of a battle with literal, physical blindness, and tempts
one to hear sadness and fear blending beneath the defensive, hectoring tone. This
strategic disavowal of blindness (“it is not I who am blind but you”) recurs, of
course, in the Second Defense in the context of Milton’s assault on the royalist’s
emotional attachment to the legacy of the martyred Charles, an attachment that he
repeatedly characterizes as effeminate.26
Such shaming recurs throughout the Second Defense of the English People, as
when he cattily refers to his continental opponent as “Salmasius (or Salmasia, for
which of the two he was, the open domination of his wife, both in public and in
private, had made it quite difficult to determine).”27 Writing against Alexander
More and Adriaan Vlacq, respectively the supposed author and the publisher of
The Cry of the Royal Blood to Heaven, against the English Parricides, whose agitated attacks
upon both Milton’s person constituted the occasion for the Second Defense, Milton
transfers the accusation from an ad hominem attack into a corresponding charge
against their writing: “These peddlers of effeminate little verses – who would not
despise them?”28 While such rhetorical assaults are neither surprising given the
pamphlet-war context nor particularly unique to Milton, I wish to argue that they
are, for all this, more than a passing reflex of vituperation. If, in cocking one’s ear
to the tone with which the linked accusations of sodomy and effeminacy are
thrown at Milton’s enemies in the tracts and pamphlets, one hears curiously
persistent notes of strangled, encrypted, and disavowed identification, some might
object that this only indexes the perverse interpretive reflex engendered by a rote
queer studies praxis all too eager to immediately flip expressions of disgust into
expressions of covert desire. Such moves can of course seem awfully glib, a kind
of queer-positive theoretical variant of the everyday acts of “wild psychoanalysis”
committed beneath the shade of a popular psychology giggling to itself about
omnipresent “latent homosexuality.” Sometimes disgust is just disgust. And yet,
Milton’s willingness to publicly connect blindness with sodomy in the context of
his pamphlet-war combat with his Royalist enemies is simply too fraught with
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overdetermined layers of identification and disavowal to ignore, precisely because
the trope of sodomitical blindness was invoked in the period as a figure for both
physically reproductive “errant” desires and for textually (over)productive critical
activity.
Admittedly, the counterintuitive assertion that “blind” acts of sodomy
must be understood as reproductive in a manner that models certain kinds of textual
productivity will require some historical explanation and fleshing out. The
accusation in Eikonoklastes that the men of Sodom suffered from some kind of
spiritual “blindness” was indeed a commonplace; what is compelling for my
argument is that this specific connection between blindness and sodomy was
figured in the prose of the period not (only) in conjunction with homosexuality
but with the production of monstrous and chimerical hybrids that were said to be
the result of acts of sodomy committed upon animals. Consider the following
extended discussion of “a cow that gave birth to a half- man” in Ambroise Paré’s
teratological tract On Monsters and Marvels:
Now I shall refrain from writing here about several other
monsters engendered from such grist, together with their
portraits, which are so hideous and abominable, not only to
see but also to hear tell of, that, due to their great
loathsomeness I have neither wanted to relate them nor
have them portrayed. For (as Boistau says, after having
related several sacred and profane stories, which are all filled
with grievious punishment for lechers) what can atheists
and sodomists expect, who (as I said above) couple against
God and Nature with brute animals? On this subject, Saint
Augustine says the punishment of lechers is to fall into blindness and
to become insane, after they have forsaken God, and not to see their
blindness, being unable to follow good counsel.29
Far from being condemned to an unproductive and anality-inflected sterility, the
spiritually “blind” sodomite is instead figured as all-too-fertile, creating a hybrid
offspring whose unspeakable / unrepresentable loathsomeness in fact energizes
and makes possible the very text that struggles to reject it. Unfazed by Paré’s
strong expressions of personal disgust and stated unwillingness to have such
monsters portrayed, the editors of the text accompanied his description of such
monstrous births with a suitably bizarre sequence of woodcuts depicting the
products of such unions: “Figure of a child, part dog,” “Figure of a monster with
the face of a man and the body of a goat,” “A monster, half-man, half-swine,”
“Figure of a monster like a dog with the head like a bird,” etc.30 It is here that the
queerness of early modern sodomy – rather than and indeed, instead of, the
homosexuality of early modern sodomy – emerges most forcefully: sodomitical
sexuality was imagined in the period as a potentially reproductive sexuality, and its
hybrid generativity cannot be thought outside of a subtending racial imaginary
which regarded the possibility of such mixtures with fear and fascination.
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Similarly, while descanting upon the specific quality of his opponent’s
sodomitical and effeminate deformity, Milton decries their literary production as a
monstrous hybrid in a manner that reminds one of Paré’s medical catalogues of
hybrid monsters. Consider this mockery of More and Vlaacq in the Second Defense
in terms of Paré’s beast-fable of sodomitical creation:
But listen! Another Cry, something strange and hissing. I
take it that geese are flying in from somewhere or other.
Now I realize what it is. I remember that this is the Tragedy
of a Cry. The Chorus appears. Behold two poetasters –
either two or a single one, twofold in appearance and of two
colors. Should I call it a sphinx, or that monster which
Horace described in the Ars Poetica, with the head of a
woman, the neck of an ass, clad in varied plumage, with
limbs assembled from every source? Yes, this is that very
monster.31
Far from a stereotypical overspill of a liquid femininity into the solid terrain of
masculine psychic life, the monstrous sodomitical construction of royalist writing
requires a new morphological imaginary that solders together component parts
sourced across gender and species barriers and stapled together seemingly by
chance.32 The mongrel nature of these creations mirrors the mongrel nature of
their creators, and the royalist authors are themselves understood as aggregates of
components: in a paratactic and inclusive jumbling of linked but separate
pejorative senses that calls to mind Polonius’ “tragical-comical-historicalpastoral,” Milton’s opponents are censured for presenting the public with the
blind-sodomitical-hybrid- effeminate-theatrical.
In evoking the monstrosity of a creature “with limbs assembled from
every source” taken out of Horace, Milton here refers to the lines which begin the
famous “Letter to Piso,” which I provide here in Ben Jonson’s translation as
“Horace, of the Art of Poetry”:
If to a woman’s head a painter would
Set a horse-neck, and diverse feathers fold
On every limb, ta’en from a severall creature,
Presenting upwards a fair female feature.
Which in some swarthy fish uncomely ends:
Admitted to the sight, although his friends,
Could you contain your laughter?33
In contrast with this painted image, great poetry ought to “Be simple, quite
throughout, and wholly one.” By yoking together human and animal elements and
miscegenating the “fair” and the “swarthy” into an uncomely new (anti)form, the
painter’s work fails to achieve synthesis and verisimilitude, stalling instead at the
level of collage with a one-man cadavre exquis. Yet the very priority of this
assemblage, coming as it does at the head of an extended discussion of
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compositional strategy, lends a curious kind of exemplarity and mystique to this
icon of the ridiculous; indeed the incident itself feels appended like an extraneous
head onto the rambling text that follows it, tainting the compositional lecture itself
with an associative formal resemblance to the chimerical anecdote that begins it.
Furthermore, one might want to attend to the private unveiling of this image as a
gendered scene, in which the homosocial sodality of male artist and his friends
gather together to regard a painted image of a female body gone awry. The inability
to correctly fashion an imaginary woman marks the painter with a double lack: a
lapse in artistic skill that may also signal a failure of sexual maturity and savoirfaire. One has failed as a man and as a painter if one does not know how to “make”
a woman. Further complicating this humorous scene, racial anxiety compounds
and reinforces gender monstrosity. The mixture of the human and the inhuman
and the mixture of the “fair” and the “swarthy” presents human- animal hybrids
and racially mixed hybrids as if it were already intuitively obvious that they figure
each other, thus reifying the subordinate inhumanity of “swarthy” races as a
naturalized reflection of the species barrier among animals while replacing the
frightening possibility of the biological viability of interracial mixtures with a
comically “impossible” gallimaufry of scraps.
One way to measure the distance between Horatian poetics and their early
modern recurrence is precisely in the shifting position of such assemblages along
the spectrum between praise and blame. Far from functioning transparently as a
self-evident example of the failure of the poet to observe the laws of
representational decorum, by the sixteenth century the construction of such
chimerical assemblages came to be daringly identified with the very essence of the
poetic act, now redefined as a prosthetic extension of the natural into “a new
nature.” The phrase comes from Sir Philip Sidney’s Defence of Poetry (1595), in which
the quasi-magical capacity of the poet to re-form nature is invoked in reference to
the deliberate construction of the unnatural: “Only the poet, disdaining to be tied
to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth grow
in effect another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth,
or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature, as the Heroes, Demigods,
Cyclops, Chimeras, Furies, and such like.”34 If this repertoire of new creations is
resolutely classical, the assertion of the dignity of artificiality sounds a distinctly
un-Horatian note, but also admits directly the possibility of the chimerical
assemblage as a desired object, as something not only monstrous but also
intoxicating, fascinating.
Such a possibility is consciously kept under wraps in Milton’s prose. For
Milton, at least in the heated moment of rhetorical battle, the compositional failure
involved in fashioning such a “very monster” reflects back upon the failed genders
of their creators in a manner calculated to revive the censorious critical laughter
that Horace also sought to inspire. The effeminacy of More and Vlaacq, their
status as men somehow mixed with and compromised by a contemptible surplus
of femininity, is mirrored in the formal admixtures of their literary creations: they,
like their writing, are hybrids, chimerical assemblages, equally comical and
repellent. But the Horatian background to Milton’s passing swipe also signals a
more important connection between the gendered rhetoric of his prose and the
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imaginative substratum of his poetry. The Horatian monstrosity is not only part
female, but part fish, and this specific woman/fish assemblage recurs in a telling
(and also partially submerged) manner in Milton’s representation of Dagon, the
Philistine deity whose festival triggers Samson’s cataclysmic outburst of divine
violence in Samson Agonistes.

Dagon as Queer Assemblage
Reappearing at every stage of his poetic development, the image of Dagon’s
violated, inhuman form seems to enjoy the status of an idée fixe in Milton’s literary
imagination. Dagon initially appears in “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity,” in
Milton’s first catalog of pagan divinities bewailing the birth of the Savior, as an
epithet of abuse rather than a proper name: “Peor and Baalim, / Forsake their
temples dim, / With that twice-battered god of Palestine.” (lines 197-199) When
Dagon returns in the catalog of pagan gods and “gay religions of pomp and gold”
in Book I of Paradise Lost, Milton’s describes in detail this “twice battered”
Palestinian body’s progress from hybrid formation to humbling mutilation:
Next came one
Who mourned in earnest, when the captive ark
Maimed his brute image, head and hands lopped off
In his own temple, on the grunsel edge,
Where he fell flat, and shamed his worshippers:
Dagon his name, sea monster, upward man
And downward fish: yet had his temple high
Reared in Azotus, dreaded through the coast
Of Palestine, in Gath and Ascalon
And Accaron and Gaza’s frontier bounds. (457-466)
The recent Kerrigan, Rumrich and Fallon edition points out that “‘Dag’ is Hebrew
for fish” but does not further clarify that Dagon’s fishy provenance is the result
of a false etymological slippage between the original Ugaritic root word for grain
(“dgn”) and its Hebrew near- homonym.35 For our purposes this misprision need
not detain us, as Milton’s understanding of Dagon is derived entirely from the
Hebrew text of 1. Samuel 5.1-7, which describes the Philistine captivity of the ark
and the humiliating outcome of a combat between the Ark of the Covenant and
the idol of Dagon. In the Geneva Bible (1560) the passage reads as follows:
Then the Philistims toke the Arke of God and caryed it from
Eben-ezer unto Ashdod, Evn the Philistims toke the Arke
of God, and broght it into the house of Dagon, and set it by
Dagon. And they of Ashdod rose the next day in the
morning, beholde, Dagon was fallen upon his face on the
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ground before the Arke of the Lord, and they toke up
Dagon, and set him in his place againe. Also they rose up
early in the morning the next day, & beholde, Dagon was
falle upon his face on the grounde before the Arke of the
Lord, and the head of Dagon and the two palmes of his
hands were cut off upon the thresholde: onely the stumpe
of Dagon was left to him. (I. Samuel 5.1-4)
Period Biblical scholarship rendered the latent “meaning” in Dagon’s name
explicit in marginal commentary on this passage; the Geneva Bible glosses this tale
with a note that Dagon “was their chiefe idole, & as some write, from ye [. . .]
downward like a fishe, and upwarde like a man.” (I. Samuel.5.2), a description
directly echoed, but poetically corrected, in Milton’s epic, which tumbles across
the linebreak to formally enact the split in his morphology: “Dagon his name, sea
monster, upward man / And downward fish.” (462-463)36 But Milton’s sequential
descent from higher humanity to lower animality also, of course, summons in the
mind of the reader the half- conscious internal expectation of a term more
frequently held in opposition to the dominant term of “man,” namely, woman.
From the waist up Dagon may be all man, but the fishy nether regions swim with
alternate morphological possibilities.
I do not mean to suggest that Dagon is “really” female in any clear sense;
indeed, to do so would be to shut down the liquidity of Dagon’s oceanic
associations and to misrepresent the manifold nature of how Milton understands
divine form. In its capacity to slip free of the intransigent weight of the merely
sexed human, Dagon’s underlayer of hermaphroditic meanings partakes of the
material ambiguity attendant upon not only embryonic potential humans but all
spirits, both angelic and demonic:
For spirits when they please
Can either sex assume, or both; so soft
And uncompounded is their essence pure,
Nor tied or manacled with joint or limb,
Nor founded on the brittle strength of bones,
Like cumbrous flesh; but in what shape they choose
Dilated or condensed, bright or obscure,
Can execute their airy purposes
And works of love or enmity fulfill. (423-431)
Noting such choice and flexibility only takes us so far, however, and in the case of
Dagon it ignores the brute fact of idolatry’s fixation not on an airy spirit but on an
object that can be mutilated or knocked down. The tale in Samuel of the
prostration of Dagon’s idol before the Ark, and of the subsequent decapitation of
the idol resolutely materializes Dagon into a massive, thingly affront to the
primacy of the god of Israel.
Dagon’s abased and mutilated status in the text of Samuel (first forced to
bow down to the Ark, then decapitated and symbolically “circumcised” by the
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skinning of the palms of both hands) irrevocably marks this divine body as a key
site through which to think about the anxiety generated by difference: the tribal
conflict between the Philistines and the Israelites plays itself out in a violent script
about the failure of idolatry that nonetheless resorts to its figurative logic. Dagon’s
subordination to the Ark is a battle between two idols, and the text’s sadistic
imperative to wound or insult the idol of Dagon at some level perpetuates the very
thing the story is meant to disprove (idols are powerful, and the need to physically
chasten Dagon’s idol pays perverse complement to its totemic authority and
representational fitness as a tribal protector). Marking and maiming the idol of the
enemy expresses a rage to differentiate that encrypts an anxious sense of
proximity; it is not safe to set Dagon and the Ark beside each other. If Dagon’s
body is marked in its appearance in Paradise Lost as irrevocably wounded by its
encounter with the absolute sovereignty of the Ark, Dagon in Samson Agonistes
telescopes backwards before this event from Samuel to Judges, and represents
idolatry ascendant, a chiasmic popular embodiment of both the error of
monstrosity and the monstrosity of error.
Forecasting and inverting this conflict, Manoa’s shaming speech to his
son constitutes a kind of traumatic alternative to the text of Samuel, a fearful
scenario in which the God of Israel is brought low by Dagon ascendant:
This day the Philistines a popular feast
Here celebrate in Gaza, and proclaim
Great pomp, and sacrifice, and praises loud
To Dagon, as their god who hath delivered
Thee Samson bound and blind into their hands,
Them out of thine, who slew’st them many a slain.
So Dagon shall be magnified, and God,
Besides whom is no God, compared with idols,
Disglorified, blasphemed, and had in scorn
By th’idolatrous rout amidst their wine. (434-443)
We can now see why Samson’s self-hatred and Samson’s hatred of Dagon are
mutually supportive: his effeminate subjection to Dalila has produced the God of
Israel’s idolatrous subjection to Dagon. The idol’s hybridity as a man/fish
(woman) assemblage shamefully signifies Samson’s exogamous desires,
embodying in a grotesquely literal manner the “mixture with the other” that has
effeminately subjected the Nazarite hero to a foreign woman. Neither fish nor
flesh, Dagon’s mixed status recalls the shame brought down upon his head by
Samson’s own exogamous wanderings from his people in favor of sexual alliances
with ethnically (racially?) distinct women, first with the nameless “woman of
Timna” and then with Dalila. To put it baldly, so to speak, Samson’s shame arises
as a result of his sexual preference. His status as the deliverer and judge of his
people has been compromised by his desire to stray from them into bed with
Canaanites and Philistines.
Seen from different angles, Dagon represents both Samson and Dalila,
and this mutual figuration furthers the play of resemblance within the text as
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“manliness” encounters itself in its others. As a strange woman and her strange
god, Dalila and Dagon are made to subtly stand in for each other in a revealing, if
comic, moment in Samson Agonistes when the chorus describes the approach of an
ambiguous figure to the blind hero: “But who is this, what thing of sea or land? /
Female of sex it seems” (710-711) The chorus’ confusion about this mysterious
entity from either sea or land has been taken to be a mockery of Aristotelian
disquisition and progressively finer distinctions, but it also seems richly resonant
with Dagon’s chimerical status as an idolatrous “thing” composed of elements
from both “sea” and “land.” Dalila’s mysterious apparition to the chorus hovers
between the borders policed by the anti-idolatrous injunction of Exodus 20.4.
(“You shall not make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is
in heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the
earth.”) In elevating his romantic allegiance to Dalila above his duties as a Nazarite
to Israel, Samson in effect has committed a kind of romantic/sexual idolatry in
choosing her that the poetic drama works to repudiate and correct. If Dalila only
“seems” to be of female sex, this certainly calls the chorus’ own visual acuity into
question, fingering them as “blind guides” to Samson who only just see better than
the blind slave they counsel, but it also further amplifies the queerness of the
Dalila/Dagon pair, suggesting that there is something misleading or astray about
their very gender, something either in disguise or permanently in the process of
becoming. In the wake of her final salvo to Samson, Dalila becomes an animal:
“She’s gone, a manifest serpent by her sting / Discovered in the end, till now
concealed.” (997-998) In this final act of “becoming animal” she shares a fate with
Samson’s posthumous choral description, which is, is Julia Lupton’s fine phrase,
“a veritable eruption of animalia.”37 Figuring him first as a Dragon, and then as an
Eagle, Samson’s aura of monstrous power and brute inhumanity are subjected to
a final torque of gender and species re-assignment when the chorus compares his
final resurgence of divine strength with the resurrection of the female Phoenix
from her own “ashy womb” (1697-1705).

Samson as “Terrorist Look-Alike” and Dagon Look-Alike
Less than kin and more than kind, “anxiety” and “terror” occupy a usefully
disjunctive proximity to each other in critical work on affect, and since I have slid
between these two terms in order to think about Samson’s anxiety and his acts of
terror as a linked pair, I had better explain why. As Sianne Ngai has usefully
sketched in the introduction to her chapter on anxiety in Ugly Feelings, anxiety is
both omnipresent and under-theorized, particularly in psychoanalysis, where, in
an account less than fully cashed out by Freud, it is suggestively if fleetingly
described as the projected displacement onto others of a trait disavowed yet
discovered in the self.38 Described by Ernst Bloch as an “expectant emotion” that
“opens out entirely [into the] horizon of time,” anxiety manifests its distorting
effects in the present on behalf of a dreadful, imminent futurity, a potentiality held
always in reserve.39 By contrast, to rise from “mere” anxiety to the exalted and
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heightened affective state of genuine “terror” would seem to require some kind of
direct encounter with the threatening presence/existence of the object-cause of
fear; terror, to be legitimate, needs some kind of proof or objective ratification,
and here Ngai’s attention to the “ignoble” strains of affect usefully flags the
problematic comparative “weakness” of anxiety in comparison with its grandiose
neighbor, terror.40 Insofar as terror is terror “at” something and anxiety is a
projection “from” the self, the two would seem to just miss each other, falling on
either side of some hoary boundaries that we theorists are said to do without:
public/private, self/other.
But the overlapping yet distinct states of terror and anxiety can feed and
sustain each other: Within the rhetorical self-understanding of the ongoing “war
on terror” that characterizes both government policy and public discourse in the
United States, the wrenching, confirming experience of terrorist violence “proves”
that our sources of terror have an external cause in this world whose potential
future resurgence verifies and legitimates an ongoing, endless vigilance whose
signature affect is a slow burn of omnipresent anxiety. Anxiety stands in for but
also draws its support from the enabling fact of “terror,” closing a feedback loop
anchored at both ends of a temporal horizon: the terror of “then” sanctions the
anxiety of “now” on behalf of an endlessly expected return of a terror “to come.”
Working through the intersection of these terms, I think we can overlay
the temporal/social structure of displacement at the core of theories of anxiety
onto the dramatic structure of Samson Agonistes, allowing us to think about
Samson’s final act of destructive religious violence (an act of “terror”) as a violent
ratification and expulsive expression of an ongoing emotional state (his nonstop
“act” – in the sense of public affective display – of anxiety). Releasing anxiety into
terror, the destruction of the feast of Dagon is the triumphant terrorist catastrophe
that retroactively justifies and releases the affect stored/savored/suffered as
anxiety across Milton’s notoriously static, staunchly talky exercise in Senecan
closet-drama. Framed thusly, that very dramatic structure’s problematic
resemblance to narrative arcs at work in the ongoing “war on Terror,” a context
through which Milton’s text is increasingly read, redoubles this problem of anxiety
as the refusal of a resemblance (or, really, the terrifying grip of the fearful
recognition of a resemblance). In particular, I think we can read recent
expenditures of critical energy dedicating to preventing terrorist meaning from
attaching to Milton as themselves an ongoing work of anxious displacement.
This is particularly the case with the pressure that the Carey/Fish debate
continues to exert upon the scene of Milton interpretation. Acknowledgement of
the “debate” is mandatory, if the introductory comments included in recent critical
editions of Milton are taken as evidence. Stoking the flames in a contest of ever
more indignant and anxious defenses of Milton/Fish (it is occasionally hard to tell
the difference in the more partisan accounts) from these charges, the recent
anthology Milton in the Age of Fish: Essays on Authorship, Text, and Terrorism collects
together a range of responses to the controversy, including, naturally, a
quintessentially barbed and bemused contribution from Fish himself.
To reduce things down to proper size, the dispute hinges upon debates
about the fitness of Carey’s account of Fish’s account of Milton’s account of
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Samson’s understanding of a divine message from God that sanctions the violent
destruction of the feast of Dagon. In a usefully skeptical assessment of the entire
exchange, Feisal G. Mohammed notes the subterranean consensus that organizes
this mutually convenient display of polemical pyrotechnics on both the (lonely)
Carey side and in the (overpopulated) Fish camp. Each side works to protect
Milton from openly advocating a “terrorist” meaning. Having parsed Fish’s
reading as one which leads us to the uncomfortable conclusion that Milton gives
us no way to discredit the “great act” that Samson commits, Carey’s most
inflammatory statements are interrogatives: if this is what Samson Agonistes itself
advocates, “should [the work] not be withdrawn from schools and colleges and,
indeed, banned more generally as an incitement to terrorism?”41 These calls are
designed to prompt a solidly humanist “surely not” from the TLS congregation,
and manifest Carey’s faith that Milton must be critiquing religious violence and
urging us to read Samson’s “rousing inward motions” that prompt his destruction
of the temple of Dagon critically and ironically.42
Demurring from common ground, the Fish contingent respond that the
problem of how to evaluate Samson’s violence is the point of the poem, alleging
that we cannot know whether or not Milton condemns Samson because we cannot
know whether the “rousing inward motions” that Samson feels do indeed come
from God or not.43 The dispute stalls at the limits of what we can know about
“the interior recesses of the willing and intending heart.”44 There is, I think, a
curious queer echo here. Try reading the following account of Samson’s
motivations with a queer inflection: “Only the intention, the unbidden and
constitutive inward orientation, makes the difference, and the difference can only
be recognized by one who is its (internal) bearer. It takes one to know one.”45 Fish is
talking about how to tell a terrorist from a religiously inspired hero, but his
language of “willing hearts” and “unbidden orientations” suggests an altogether
queerer register of intersubjective speculation. Reading the anxiety generated by
the threat of effeminacy “within” (in every sense) Samson alongside the critical
anxiety generated by the threat of terrorist meaning within Milton’s text, a shared
logic of displacement produces a formal structure in which an inaccessible abyss
of interiority is posited as a bar to knowing/seeing. Effeminacy on the plane of
gender and terrorism on the plane of religious politics occupy a shared structural
position as the excluded-yet-ineradicable perverse possibility that mobilizes and
justifies a violent and repressive response within the text and in the persistent
patterns of critical denial outside and about it.46
I hope I have not been struggling by oblique or critically paranoid means
to say that there is some proto-, crypto-, demi-, quasi-, or pseudo-homosexual
subject buried “within” the encrypted inwardness of Samson’s “rousing inward
motions,” nor am I suggesting that his repeated bewailing of his effeminacy
constitutes some repudiation of an “inner” homosexual subjectivity.47 Patently,
Samson’s anxiety about his effeminacy is not hidden, repressed or concealed; it’s
there on the page before us, and present in his mouth as he bewails its “foul
embrace” to anyone who will listen. What is displaced, disavowed, or refused by
Samson is a feeling of proximity or resemblance between himself and the
creaturely hybridity of Dagon, a feeling that collects as anxiety and explodes into
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terror. With this dynamic in mind, let us now return to Lupton’s formulation with
which I began: “Milton’s Samson is finally not typological (a figure of Christ), or
even typological in a terminally suspended way (“exil’d from light”), but antitypological, arresting the recuperative moment of typology in the sheer violence of
his act.”48 The title of Lupton’s essay, “Samson Dagonistes,” elegantly weds two
elements that I have joined together, with far less elegance, as a “queer
assemblage,” and I owe much of my own understanding of how to think about
the politics and poetics of Milton’s writing to her example. But here I want to
suggest that the violent resistance to the hold or claim of typology within Samson
that Lupton detects might be directed not forward to Christian appropriations and
equivalences but “backwards,” to the forces of chthonic and pagan idolatry that
press up against his blind, subjected, “effeminated” Nazarite body. The
resemblance being violently rejected is not a resemblance between Samson and
Christ but rather the resemblance between Samson and Dagon, the typological
equivalence that Lupton’s very title proposes, in which the sidelong axis of
comparison and competition (which will later produce the decisive conflict
between God and Dagon in 1 Samuel) screens out the backwards/inwards
pressure of effeminacy within and the terrifying, terror-producing pressures of
racial/sexual/ethnic/species-based otherness without.

Chimerical Conclusion
The notion of an “assemblage” need not, in and of itself, arrive fraught with
terrifying implications: if Dagon is an inter-species assemblage, so is a chicken and
bacon sandwich. Yet the chimerical hybrid body remains threatening, and
threateningly present all the same, and not only in the terrorist register that Jasbir
Puar has theorized; as hasty legislation and corporate bioethical policy boards
struggle to catch up with the accelerating pace of genetic engineering, our own
historical moment is one of the nonstop proliferation of biological chimeras,
hybrids, mashups, “queer assemblages” across national borders and species
barriers.49 In a passage from “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” that has become
something of a touchstone for queer theory, Michel Foucault wrote that: “History
becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very
being–as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and
sets it against itself.”50 Surveying the ruined panorama of the present, it is not hard
to find discontinuities in our being, divided emotions, instinctual dramas,
multiplied bodies, and states divided against themselves. Indeed, it’s hard not to
find them. One might point to the way that Craigslist murders compete with
transatlantic bombers, embryonic rabbit-human fusions, pigs whose hearts beat
with human blood, and instantly uplinked cell phone footage of bombed funerals,
bombed weddings, executed tyrants and decapitated journalists for the
morcellated remains of our attention – were it not for the sad certainty that
nothing dates faster than the contemporary indexes of our own supposedly
irreversible freefall into fragmentation. If (and this is a genuine if) the trans-
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historical acts of recognition that queer studies have up to now provided have
helped us to understand the desires, pleasures, and terrors of bodies past, there is
no standing guarantee that these logics – of assemblage, of anxiety – will continue
to address the divided and discontinuous bodies of today. Foucault told us that
“the genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin.”51 What
resources do we need in order to converse with the chimeras of the present?
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30. Paré, 68-71.
31. Milton, The Complete Prose Works, 1085.
32. At once pictorial and theatrical, the Cry is a monstrous hybrid of persons, genders,
species, “colors,” and materials. The association of the royalist cause with a maudlin, overwrought
and hence risible form of theatricality, implicit in his mockery of “the Tragedy of a Cry,” follows
from Milton’s dismissal of William Marshall’s notorious depiction of Charles I that graced Eikon
Basilike; Milton described it as “the conceited portraiture before his book, drawn out to the full measure
of a masking scene” (1062, italics mine) Victoria Kahn has noted Milton’s response to Marshall’s
drawing and to the royalist propaganda that surrounded as a critical refusal of the psychology of

Early Modern Culture 10

85

Dagon as Queer Assemblage

pity in favor of “the unsentimental application of justice,” but Kahn is less concerned with the
explicit gendering of sentimentality. See Victoria Kahn, “Aesthetics as Critique: Tragedy and
Trauerspiel in Samson Agonistes.” Reading Renaissance Ethics, ed. Marshall Grossman (New York:
Routledge, 2007), 104-29, 105.
33. Ben Jonson, “Horace, of the Art of Poetry,” The Complete Poems, ed. George Parfitt,
(London: Penguin Books, 1975), 354-371, 354.
34. Sir Philip Sidney, “A Defence of Poetry” (1595), in English Renaissance Literary
Criticism, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 336-392, 343.
35. See Milton, The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose, 310. For an account of the
confusion generated by this name, see Joseph Fontenrose. “Dagon and El” Oriens 10.2 (1957): 27779.
36. Milton loves this trick, which has its debut in an account of another group of
animal/human hybrids, the “monsters” engendered by the enchanted liquid in Circe’s magic cup:
“Whoever tasted, lost his upright shape / And downward fell into a groveling swine.” (Milton, “A
Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634” [Comus], lines 52- 53). Unlike his Homeric source, in
Milton’s version of Comus’ acts of transmogrification, only the head of the enchanted person is
transformed, thus producing another cross-species assemblage. As described in his stage
directions, Comus enters “with his rout of monsters headed like sundry sorts of wild beasts, but otherwise like
men and women.” (Milton, “A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634,” 67).
37. Lupton, “Samson Dagonistes,” 199.
38. Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 203. Lacan
admits as much in his introductory remarks to his seminar on anxiety of 1962-63: “There is no
subject where the net of the Freudian discourse is closer, in short, to giving us a false sense of
security; because precisely, when we go into this text [Freud’s ‘Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety’]
you will see what is to be seen in connection with anxiety, that there is no net, because precisely as
regards anxiety, each mesh, as I might appropriately put it, has no meaning except by leaving the
void in which anxiety is. In the discourse, thank God, of ‘Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety,’
everything is spoken about except anxiety. (Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Anxiety 1962 1963, Book X, trans. Cormac Gallgher [Eastbourne, Antony Rowe, 1995], 6, italics mine.)
Lacan explicitly defines anxiety as an affect (rather than an emotion) which is not, itself, subject to
repression: “One finds it displaced, mad, inverted, metabolized, but it is not repressed. What is
repressed are the signifiers which moor it” (11). Surveying the concept’s formulations in Freud and
deciding that they do not add up to a unitary theory of anxiety, in The Language of Psychoanalysis
Laplanche and Pontalis split the difference with two separate entries on “Anxiety Neurosis” and
“Anxiety Hysteria” (J. Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald
Nicholson-Smith [New York: W. W. Norton, 1973], 37-40). The most extended account of anxiety
seems to occur in the analysis of the phobia of Little Hans.
39. Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 210.
40. Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 7.
41. Carey, “A Work in Praise of Terrorism?,” 16.
42. As Kerrigan, Rumrich, Fallon and others have noted, the argument that we are
meant to critique rather than celebrate Samson’s “great act” was first made in 1986 by Joseph
Wittreich in Interpreting Samson Agonistes (Milton, The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose, 703). Carey
added polemical urgency to a critical position that does not, in and of itself, stand or fall based on
his additional claims about the resemblance between the biblical source and contemporary politics.
Debates about whether or not such a historical effect of resemblance produces a transformation of
the meaning of a literary work can neither support nor undermine the specific argument about
Milton’s representation of Samson. The heat of the rhetorical moment in which Carey’s essay
appeared seems to have produced as an unfortunate side effect the impression that the success or
failure of this reading could somehow index, and prove or disprove, a larger claim about the
historical nature of an artwork’s meaning.
43. Even Julia Lupton, in the context of an entirely separate set of theoretical
commitments and concerns, seems to arrive at a distinctly Fish-ian suspension on this topic, when
she writes at the end of her discussion of Samson’s violence as an example of the Benjaminian
category of “divine violence,” that “Milton neither glorifies nor condemns such violence, but
rather explores its conditions and calls us to judge it.” (“Samson Dagonistes,” 184). By stopping

Early Modern Culture 10

86

Queer Milton

short of a decision and leaving her readers precariously exposed to these contradictory outcomes,
Lupton’s very avoidance of the obvious options (glorify? condemn?) constitutes itself a kind of
choice, and one that places her alongside the Fish position, albeit on her own terms.
44. Fish, How Milton Works, 252.
45. Fish, How Milton Works, 252, italics mine.
46. Participants in the Samson Agonistes “debate” (if that is what it is/was) are not arguing
coherently from shared terms, but collaboratively dismantling the platform upon which such a
debate might take place by insisting upon mutually incongruous semantic constructions of
“terrorism,” with Carey’s decision to elastically apply a modern political term to a Renaissance
poem from a Biblical source cue-ing a nominalist restriction of the phrase on the part of Fish.
Thus, at a certain level the debate about whether or not one can talk intelligibly about early modern
terrorists replicates the debate about whether or not one can talk intelligibly about early modern
homosexuals. The historically correct cop-out simply avoids unpleasantness by circumscribing the
conceptual availability of a threatening and “modern” phenomenon to Renaissance subjects and
the problem is solved.
To ask the vulgar question: Would John Milton have thought of himself as endorsing
something that he would have understood as equivalent to “terrorism” as this term is used today?
Obviously, to ask the question at all is already to assume that terrorism is a unity about which a
“we” has coalesced in a shared sense of what does and does not count as an act of terrorism, and
consigns offstage the attendant debates about the difference between political liberation
movements and terrorism and where to place acts of sabotage intended to disrupt the domination
of a foreign power along the continuum of strategic acceptability. Would John Milton have
approved of violent acts if they were committed on behalf of a religious position with which he
sided? If we are to draw upon Christian Doctrine for evidence, the immediate answer is an obvious
and resounding negative. People should be free to write about the Bible and express varying
opinions upon it, and “Without this freedom to which I refer, there is no religion and no gospel.
Violence alone prevails; and it is disgraceful and disgusting that the Christian religion should be supported by
violence” (1143, italics mine). Yet if we rephrase the question in another way, a different response is
generated. If God tells us to do something, ought we to do it? The answer to this sort of question,
as Fish has delighted in reminding inattentive readers of Milton, is resoundingly yes.
47. For a reading of the place of melancholy in this interior/exterior architecture which
both draws upon but diverges from these remarks, see Drew Daniel “My Self, My Selpucher:
Assembling Melancholy Masculinity in Samson Agonistes,” The Melancholy Assemblage: Affect and
Epistemology in the English Renaissance (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 251-290.
48. Lupton, “Samson Agonistes,” 202.
49. As one example among many, consider a Washington Post article that followed closely
upon the announcement in 2003 from Shanghai Secondary Medical University that hybrid
human/animal embryos had been bred and allowed to live for several days while stem cell tissue
was being harvested: “In Minnesota, pigs are being born with human blood in their veins. In
Nevada, there are sheep whose livers and hearts are largely human. In California, mice peer from
their cages with human brain cells firing in their skulls. [. . .] Biologists call these hybrid animals
chimeras, after the mythical Greek creature with a lion’s head, a goat’s body and a serpent’s tail.”
Rick Weiss, “Of Mice, Men and In-Between: Scientists Debate Blending of Human, Animal
Forms,” Washington Post. November 20, 2004.
50. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 154.
51. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 144.

Early Modern Culture 10

87

